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ABSTRACT
As the field of robotics matures robots will need some
method of displaying and modeling emotions. One way
of doing this is to use a human-like face on which the
robot can make facial expressions corresponding to its
emotional state. Yet the connection between a robot’s
emotional state and its physical facial expression is not
an obvious one: while a smile can gradually increase or
decrease in size, there is no principled method of us-
ing boolean logic to map changes in facial expressions
to changes in emotional states. We give a philosophical
analysis of the problem and show that it is rooted in the
vagueness of robot emotions. We then outline several
methods that have been used in the philosophical lit-
erature to model vagueness and propose an experiment
that uses our humanoid robot head to determine which
philosophical theory is best suited to the task.
INTRODUCTION
It has been argued that the ability to display emotions
on a human-like face is both an important and neces-
sary step in making robots and computer agents more
accessible to the general public [1, 7]. The emotional
model for a robotic face will have two key components:
a mapping of emotional states to facial positions and a
method of transitioning between different pairs of emo-
tional states and facial positions. For example, we map
‘happy’ on our robot to a widening of its face and eyes
and a slight opening of its mouth: in other words, a
smile. We say the robot is ‘sad’ when its eyes fall and
face narrows. Some method is now needed of transi-
tioning between ‘happy’ and ‘sad’ that both displays
the transition on the robot’s face and captures the emo-
tional state of the robot throughout the transition.
We begin by introducing our notation and the philo-
sophical problem of vagueness. We then show how, in
boolean logic, there is no principled method of select-
ing a particular facial position to use as the boundary
between two different emotional states. The problem
arises because robot emotions, along with many linguis-
tic predicates in natural language, are vague. Philoso-
phers have studied paradoxes of vagueness since antiq-
uity and while they are no closer to solving problems
of vagueness than computer scientists, an examination
of the philosophical problem of vagueness will allow
researchers to better model emotions and their corre-
sponding facial expressions in a robot face.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
The robot head we are using consists of many parts,
each of which is controlled by a servo. Let vˆ be a vec-
tor that contains the variables which denote the servo’s
position. We use Pvˆ to denote the head’s position when
the servos are set to the positions contained in vˆ. For
example, vˆ = {100, 90, 40} would set face width = 100,
eyelid width = 90, and mouth open = 40. Although
our particular robot head contains up to 16 servos, we
have combined some and omitted others from vˆ to sim-
plify our examples. We define the following vectors:
vˆ1 = {100, 100, 40}
vˆ2 = {85, 100, 40}
vˆ3 = {50, 100, 40}
vˆ4 = {15, 100, 40}
vˆ5 = {0, 100, 40}
Each emotional state is denoted by a boolean variable
Sα, whose value is returned by the function t. We use
Sh to denote the emotional state ‘happy’. The robot
is ‘happy’ if and only if t(Sh) = 1; the robot is ‘not
happy’ if and only if t(Sh) = 0. We use ¬ to denote log-
ical negation; thus, ¬Sh denotes the state ‘not happy’.
Because we are initially working in boolean logic, we
assume that if the robot is ‘not happy’ it is ‘sad’; thus,
the robot is ‘sad’ when t(Sh) = 0, or t(¬Sh) = 1. To
denote the robot’s emotional state given its facial posi-
tion, expressed as a vector vˆ, we use Sαvˆ .
Events cause, among other things, the robot’s facial po-
sition to move. For example, as negative events occur
the robot’s smile will slowly disappear. As is the case
with humans, multiple facial positions can correspond
to the same emotion. For example, both vˆ1 and vˆ2 map
to state Sh, meaning t(Shvˆ1) = 1 and t(Shvˆ2) = 1. We
let vˆ4 and vˆ5 map to state ‘sad’, ¬Sh, which means
t(¬Shvˆ4) = 1 and t(¬Shvˆ5) = 1.
THE VAGUENESS OF ROBOT EMOTIONS
Suppose we want to build a robot office assistant that,
among other things, delivers mail to office employees.
We define its facial position as Pvˆ6, where vˆ6 =
{i, 100, 40}. Note that when i = 100, vˆ6 = vˆ1, and
t(Shvˆ6) = 1. Each time the robot successfully completes
a task we increase i to make the robot look happier,
and each time the robot fails to complete a task we
decrease i to make the robot look sadder. For example,
if the robot spills coffee on a human we might set i =
i−70, but if the robot delivers an envelope to the wrong
employee we might only set i = i− 1.
The Boundary Between Sh and ¬Sh
The fundamental problem with this model is that we
cannot determine the i that marks the location where
the robot changes from state Sh to state ¬Sh. Suppose
the face is in position Pvˆ3. We are just as justified
in holding that position Pvˆ3 corresponds to state ¬Sh
as we are in holding that position Pvˆ3 corresponds to
state Sh. We do not want to arbitrarily assign Pvˆ3 to
Sh or ¬Sh, as to hold that position Pvˆ3 is the precise
cut-off between emotional states Sh and ¬Sh is to hold
that while some large number of negative events may
occur to move the robot’s face from position Pvˆ1 to Pvˆ3,
the robot’s emotional state remains constant at Sh; yet
if one small, seemingly insignificant event causes the
robot’s face to move past position Pvˆ3 and toward Pvˆ4,
the robot’s emotional state will suddenly change from
Sh to ¬Sh. This is clearly counterintuitive as, among
healthy humans, small, insignificant actions should not
cause sudden changes in emotional states.
Suppose we use Pvˆ3 as the boundary between Sh and¬Sh. Recall that the face of the office robot is in po-
sition Pvˆ6 and suppose that, at a given point during
the day, i = 85: since vˆ6 = vˆ2 we know the robot is
‘happy’. If the robot spills coffee on an employee then
i = 85− 70 = 15 and vˆ6 = vˆ4; the robot becomes ‘sad’.
This result conforms to our intuition that if a person
is happy and they make a big mistake, such as spilling
coffee on a co-worker, they will become unhappy.
Now suppose i = 85 and the robot brings a piece of mail
to the wrong employee: i = 85 − 1 = 84. This result
also conforms to our intuitions: if a person is happy and
they make a small mistake, such as bringing a piece of
mail to the wrong person, they don’t stop being happy.
Now suppose this occurs 36 times: i = 84 − 1 = · · · =
50 − 1 = 49. When the robot incorrectly delivers the
mail for the 35th time it is still happy, because i =
50, although its smile has nearly disappeared; however,
once the robot delivers mail to the wrong person for the
36th time, its mood immediately changes from ‘happy’
to ‘sad’, even though its physical appearance — the
diminished smile that is visible when i = 50 — has
changed by an imperceptibly small amount, namely by
one unit, such that i = 50−1 = 49. The problem is that
while the physical transition between the appearance of
‘happy’ and the appearance of ‘sad’ is gradual, as it is
with humans, the transition between Sh and ¬Sh is not:
despite its physical appearance, the robot will believe
it is as happy when i = 51 as it is when i = 85. When i
is decremented by one unit the change in facial position
will be hardly noticable, yet its mood instantaneously
changes from ‘happy’ to ‘sad’: from Sh to ¬Sh.
The Logic
The problem in the above example lies in our belief
that one insignificant event does not make the differ-
ence between emotional states. The linguistic vague-
ness that philosophers typically study works similarly:
words like ‘bald’ are said to be vague because one hair
does not seem to make the difference between baldness
and non-baldness. Let Shvˆ6i indicate that the robot is
in state Sh and in position Pvˆ6, given the value of i in
vˆ6. Thus, t(Shvˆ6100 ) = 1, since when i = 100, vˆ6 = vˆ1.
In boolean logic, we symbolize our belief that one in-
significant event does not make the difference between
Sh and ¬Sh as follows: ∀n(Shvˆ6n ⊃ Shvˆ6n−1 ). Yet given
this, we can prove that there is no i that marks the
cut-off between Sh and ¬Sh (see Figure 1).
1 Shvˆ6100
2 ∀n(Shvˆ6n ⊃ Shvˆ6n−1 )
3 Shvˆ6100 ⊃ Shvˆ699 ∀E, 2
4 Shvˆ699 ⇒E, 1, 3
...
...
2, 000 Shvˆ61 ⇒E,
...
2, 001 Shvˆ61 ⊃ Shvˆ60 ∀E, 2
2, 002 Shvˆ60 ⇒E, (2, 000), (2, 001)
Figure 1. Proof: if the robot is ‘happy’ when in
Pvˆ6100 , then it is ‘happy’ when in Pvˆ60
Thus, having started with an obviously true premise,
namely Shvˆ6100 , we can conclude that when i = 0 the
robot is still ‘happy’; t(Shvˆ60 ) = 1. We could construct
a similar argument, starting with ¬Shvˆ60 and assuming∀n(¬Shvˆ6n ⊃ ¬Shvˆ6n+1 ), to show that when i = 100 the
robot is still ‘not happy’: t(¬Shvˆ6100 ) = 1. Because we
are in boolean logic, where a robot that is ‘not happy’ is
‘sad’, we have been able to prove two seemingly contra-
dictory facts. We proved both that the robot is ‘happy’
when i = 0 and its facial expression is ‘sad’, and that
the robot is ‘sad’ when i = 100 and its facial expression
is ‘happy’. While boolean logic requires that we find
some vector, and thus some i, to use as the boundary
between Sh and ¬Sh, philosophers have developed sev-
eral theories of vagueness that we propose will resolve
this contradiction and properly model robot emotions.
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES
Typically, philosophical theories of vagueness give both
a metaphysical account of the phenomenon of vague-
ness and an account of our linguistic use of vague predi-
cates. While our work is focused on modeling emotions
in practical applications, the metaphysical content of
these theories should not be disregard: as the field of
human-robot interaction matures it is likely that schol-
arship will focus not only on the results achieved by
a given method but on the correctness of using that
method in the first place. In this section we present
an overview of several theories of vagueness that seem
particularly well-suited for the task of modeling robot
emotions and controlling facial expressions; it is not our
intent to give a detailed account of the philosophical lit-
erature. References for further reading are provided.
3-Valued Logics
For any variable P in boolean logic, either P is true or P
is false. By introducing additional truth values, many-
valued logics allow P to take other values. Many-valued
logics are extensions of classical logic and always have
‘true’ and ‘false’ as truth values which behave, in re-
lation to one another, as they would in classical logic
[3, p. 5]. We use a  Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic, which
has the following truth values: [0, 12 , 1]. A truth value
of 12 represents an indeterminable truth value that is
assigned to that which is possible and exists between
‘the true’ and ‘the false’; that is, 12 is truer than what
is false but falser than what is true [8]. Given two vari-
ables P and Q, negation, conjunction, disjunction, and
implication are defined thusly:
t(¬P ) = 1− t(P )
t(P ∧Q) = min(t(P ), t(Q))
t(P ∨Q) = max(t(P ), t(Q))
t(P → Q) = min(1, 1− t(P ) + t(Q))
To model emotions in a 3-valued logic, we first de-
termine which positions clearly correspond to Sh and
which clearly correspond to ¬Sh. There are two ways
that a 3-valued logic models states that are neither
clearly Sh nor clearly ¬Sh: on the truth gap theory,
these borderline cases are neither Sh nor ¬Sh while on
the truth glut theory they are both Sh and ¬Sh. On
both truth gap and truth glut theories we have the fol-
lowing truth assignments: t(Shvˆ6100 ) = 1, t(Shvˆ650 ) =
1
2 ,
and t(Shvˆ60 ) = 0. Recall that in section 1 the state
‘sad’ was said to be equivalent to the state ¬Sh: in
boolean logic, if the robot is not in state Sh, such that
t(Sh) = 1, then the robot must be in state ¬Sh, such
that t(Sh) = 0. On the 3-valued approach, however, a
robot that is not in state Sh need not be in state ¬Sh:
when t(Sh) = 12 the robot is not in state Sh nor is it
in state ¬Sh. For more information on 3-valued logics
and vagueness, see [8],[9], and [10].
Epistemicism
Epistemicism [11] holds that words like ‘tall’ and ‘bald’
have sharp boundaries that are necessarily unknowable
to us. If we extend this view to emotions like ‘happy’,
we must hold that when the robot is in Pvˆ3 it is really
either in state Sh or ¬Sh — but we can never know
which state it truly belongs in. Of course, we can pro-
gram the robot to treat Pvˆ3 as though corresponds to
Sh, but this will yield the same sudden change in emo-
tional state that we are trying to avoid. The strengths
of this theory are primarily metaphysical, and the only
practical advantage it offers is that it allows us to model
vagueness, and emotions, in boolean logic.
To model emotions according to epistemic principles, we
need to hold that there are precise facial expressions —
some of which are unknown to us — that correspond to
the robot appearing happy; all other facial expressions
correspond to the robot looking unhappy. Thus, Pvˆ1
corresponds to the robot looking happy and Pvˆ5 corre-
sponds to the robot looking unhappy. Yet according to
the epistemicist, we have no way of knowing what the
actual position of the cut-off is: we only know that it
exists. Because epistemicism was developed for linguis-
tic vagueness, many complications arise when attempt-
ing to model robot emotions using this theory. One
possibility is to have the robot inform the user that it
does not know whether it is happy or sad when in Pvˆ3;
another is to have the robot stop expressing emotion al-
together when it is in indeterminate positions like Pvˆ3
and continue expressing emotions when it returns to a
position where its emotional state is clear, such as Pvˆ2.
Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has been proposed by philosophers and used
by computer scientists to model linguistic vagueness;
computer scientists have already developed several emo-
tional models based on fuzzy logic [4, 5]. Fuzzy logic is
an infinitely-valued logic, with truth values represented
on the interval of real numbers [0, 1]. Variables, and in
this case emotional states, are represented by fuzzy sets
and objects in the domain are members of each set to
varying degrees; the degree to which a particular vari-
able belongs in the set TRUE is a variable’s degree
of truth. Negation, conjunction, and disjunction are
defined as they are in 3-valued logic, and implication
typically is as well, although other definitions are some-
times used. Thus, we initially know that t(Shvˆ6100 ) = 1
and t(Shvˆ60 ) = 0. We map the other values of i to truth
values using a membership function. Suppose the robot
is clearly happy when i > 80 and clearly unhappy when
i < 30. One possible membership function is:
if i < 30 then t(Shvˆ6i ) = 0
if 30 ≤ i ≤ 80 then t(Shvˆ6i ) =
i−30
50
if i > 80 then t(Shvˆ6i ) = 1
Using this function, the robot’s emotional state changes
along with its smile. When i = 70 the robot is ‘happy’
to degree 0.8 and ‘not happy’ to degree 0.2, t(Shvˆ670 ) =
0.8; when i = 60 the robot is ‘happy’ to degree 0.4
and ‘not happy’ to degree 0.6, t(Shvˆ660 ) = 0.4. More
information on fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory can be
found in [2] and [6].
USER STUDY: SELECTING A THEORY
Because we are not presently interested in the meta-
physical claims of the theories described in the previ-
ous section, we must use some other criterion to de-
termine which theory is best suited for mapping facial
expressions to a robot’s emotional state. Each theory
of vagueness treats positions like Pvˆ3 differently: on the
3-valued approach Pvˆ3 corresponds either to both Sh
and ¬Sh or to neither Sh nor ¬Sh, while on the fuzzy
logic approach Pvˆ3 partially corresponds to Sh and par-
tially corresponds to ¬Sh. On the epistemic view Pvˆ3
corresponds to either Sh or ¬Sh, but it is impossible for
us to know which. We propose conducting experiments
with a robot face to test user’s perceptions of emotions
that are not clearly ‘happy’ nor clearly ‘sad’ to see how
they perceive this borderline area.
Our experiment will begin with the head engaging in
a scripted one-way interaction with the user. The user
will be filling out a form in an office setting, with the
robot seated across the table; note that only the upper
body is visible to the user. At some point an event will
occur that causes the robot to enter state Sh and move
to position Pvˆ1; recall that Pvˆ1 makes the robot’s face
look as ‘happy’ as possible. The user will be explicitly
informed that, when in this position, the robot is hap-
piest. An event will then occur that causes the robot’s
face to move to position Pvˆ5 and enter state ¬Sh; re-
call that Pvˆ5 makes the robot’s face look as ‘unhappy’
as possible. Again, the user will be explicitly informed
that, when in this position, the robot is least happy.
We then let the user fill out the forms as a distraction
task. Once a brief period of time has passed, the phone
will ring and the robot head will answer, using a head-
set. While the user will only be able to hear the voice
of the robot speaking, they will hear a muﬄed voice to
indicate that someone is speaking to the robot over the
phone. At various points in the phone call the robot’s
face will move to positions between Pvˆ1 and Pvˆ5; recall
that these positions are between positions that make
the robot appear clearly happy and clearly unhappy.
Each time the face takes a new position the scenario
will ‘pause’ and a facilitator will ask the user to de-
scribe the emotional state of the robot. The user will
be able to choose one of the following options: ‘happy’,
‘not happy’, ‘happy and not happy’, ‘neither happy nor
not happy’, ‘either happy or not happy, but unsure of
which’, or ‘partially happy and partially not happy’.
The first two options conform to a traditional emotional
model, while the last four are used to represent the the-
ories of vagueness that were described in the previous
section. We hypothesize that users will choose one of
the first two options when the robot’s state is obvious;
when the state is difficult to determine, we believe users
will choose one of the last four options. If a significant
percentage of users choose one of the last four options
when the robot is in an intermediate state, then we will
have evidence indicating which theory of vagueness can
be best used to control robot emotions and facial ex-
pressions.
We hope to conduct this test using at least the emotions
‘happy’ and ‘surprised’. The scenario for ‘surprised’ will
differ from the previously described scenario for ‘happy’.
If the data shows that users associate intermediate po-
sitions with a given theory of vagueness, then we will
use literature on that theory to develop a more detailed
model of robot emotions.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we reported our efforts to model syn-
thetic emotions in a humanoid robot head using facial
expressions based on philosophical theories of vague-
ness. We begun by highlighting the importance of ac-
curate and valid emotional states in robotic interfaces
and how these might be expressed through facial ex-
pressions. We argued that vagueness is a practical chal-
lenge when attempting to model convincing and inter-
active robotic emotions based on facial expressions. We
presented three philosophical theories of vagueness that
might be used in accurately modeling robotic emotions
and facial expressions, and outlined a user study that
will enable us to evaluate and compare the usability and
effectiveness of these theories. We are currently apply-
ing the methodologies presented in the paper using a
humanoid robot head that serves as our testbed for im-
plementing the different facial expression models and
for conducting the proposed user study.
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